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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INTRODUCTION

During the past two survey periods, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has shown substantial deference to agency actions and has favored
judicial review. 1 The cases discussed herein continue this trend. In
Donovan v. Hackney Inc.,2 discussed in Part I, the Tenth Circuit showed
deference to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration by
refusing to allow court review of the validity of administrative search
warrants until the challenging party had exhausted all administrative
remedies. In three cases discussed in Part II, two dealing with uranium
mill tailings 3 and a third dealing with compound 1080, 4 the Tenth Circuit showed substantial deference to Environmental Protection Agency
action on questions involving scientific and technical expertise. In Edwards v. Valdez, 5 discussed in Part III, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Social Security Agency's interpretation of the statutory section at issue,
once again showing deference. Finally, in the cases discussed in Part
IV, 6 the Tenth Circuit favored judicial review where alternative interpretations of the statutes of limitations at issue might otherwise have barred
such review.
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, THE FOUR-CORNERS
DOCTRINE, AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:
DOINOVAN

v.

HACKNEY

In the 1985 case of Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 7 the Tenth Circuit sanctioned the issuance of an administrative search warrant. In so doing, the
Tenth Circuit upheld Judge Russell's contempt citation against appel8
lants Hackney and Schwedland.
A.

Facts

In January 1982, pursuant to an administrative inspection plan, an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance officer appeared at the facility of Hackney, Inc., in Enid, Oklahoma, to
perform a regularly programmed inspection of the premises. 9 Hack1. See Note, Administrative Law, Thirteenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 63 DEN.
U.L. REV. 165 (1986); Note, Administrative Law, Twelfth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 62
DEN. U.L. REV. 109 (1985).

2. 769 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1458 (1986).
3. American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985); American
Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985).
4. National Cattleman's Ass'n v. EPA, 773 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
5. 789 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1986); C.O.D.E., Inc. v. ICC, 768 F.2d
1210 (10th Cir. 1985).
7. 769 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986).
8. Id. at 652.
9. Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 773, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1984), af'd, 769
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ney's plant manager, Wayne Schwedland, refused to allow the inspection. As a result, OSHA sought and was issued an administrative search
warrant based on the affidavit of an OSHA supervising industrial hygienist. 10 Upon returning to the plant with the warrant, the OSHA compliance officer was again denied entry. Contempt proceedings were then
initiated. I 1

B.

District Court Proceedings

The initial issue before the district court involved the scope of review to be used in assessing the magistrate's decision to issue the search
warrant. 12 Generally, any review of the validity of a search warrant must3
be limited to an examination of materials presented to the magistrate.'
Under the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in
Franks v. Delaware,14 evidentiary hearings challenging the validity of a
search warrant will only be allowed when the challenging party is willing
and able to offer proof of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth on the part of those who seek the warrant.' 5 Hence, the review
of both administrative and criminal warrants is ordinarily confined to the
"four-corners" of the warrant application.1 6 Constitutional challenges
to the validity of the warrant are thus limited, since the party subject to
the inspection may not challenge the administrative plan upon which the
warrant is based. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals wrestled with this issue in Hackney.
In reviewing applicable cases, the district court noted that courts
have adopted two approaches to this problem. Under one approach, if
the party named in the inspection refuses to permit the inspection, it can7
raise challenges to the administrative plan in contempt proceedings.'
When following the other approach, courts require an exhaustion of administrative remedies, whereby the challenging party allows the search
and attacks the validity of the administrative plan upon which the warrant is based in subsequent citation proceedings before the OccupaF.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1458 (1986). Apparently the OSHA compliance officer was seeking to perform the inspection as allowed by an OSHA inspection
plan. Id. at 776; see OSHA CPL 2.25B (OSHA inspection plan).
10. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 775.
11. Id.
12. If reasonable legislative, administrative, or judicially prescribed standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling, probable cause to
issue an administrative search warrant exists. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). The probable cause involved in
Hackney was based on an administrative plan. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17 & 33.
13. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Although Franks involved warrant review in a criminal case, it is generally accepted that the same reasoning applies to administrative inspection warrants. Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 100 (10th Cir. 1981);
Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 776.
14. 438 U.S. 154.
15. Id. at 171.
16. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 776. For application of the four-corners doctrine, see
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
17. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 776. See also Weyerhauser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373
(7th Cir. 1979); Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
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tional Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). 18 An adverse
finding by OSHRC can then be appealed to the court of appeals. 19 The
district court, relying on the Tenth Circuit's opinions in Marshall v. Horn
Seed Co. ,20 and Robert K. Bell Enterprises v. Donovan, 2 1 chose to apply the
latter approach.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution requires
'2 3
that a search be "reasonable," '2 2 and supported by "probable cause."
In addition, it is well settled that inspections under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act 24 must be made pursuant to a valid administrative
warrant. 25 As with criminal warrants, the administrative warrant serves
to provide property owners with sufficient information to assure them
that the entry is legal.

26

When opting to follow the second alternative, the district court
acknowledged that the search must have taken place in order to avoid
contempt citations. Initially, it appears as if "such a procedure fails to
protect Defendants against a potentially unconstitutional search." '2 7
However, it is clear that inspection pursuant to an administrative warrant is a much less substantial intrusion than entering a private home
pursuant to a search warrant. 28 Here, the Hackney plant was selected
for inspection pursuant to a programmed plan. Accordingly, the court
held that Hackney's fourth amendment interests were adequately pro18. "The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative
agency to perform functions within its special competence - to make a factual record, to
apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies."
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
194 (1968)). Accord Baldwin Metals Co. v. Donovan, 642 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 893 (1981); In Re Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc., 592 F.2d 611
(1st Cir. 1979).
19. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 777.
20. 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1981).
21. 710 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
22. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
23. "[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
25. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
26. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
27. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 777.
28. The fourth amendment protects commercial buildings, as well as private homes.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
Whereas probable cause for the search of a private home must be based on specific
evidence of a crime, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); United States
v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1980), probable cause for an administrative inspection need only be based on a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment.
Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 320; Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; see supra note 12. An administrative
warrant may therefore be based on a "showing that a specific business has been chosen for
an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the
Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various
types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the
lesser divisions of the areas .... Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321.
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tected by the availability of a post-inspection challenge. 29
The district court then addressed the issue of whether the warrant
application presented to the magistrate indicated the existence of probable cause. 30 Applying the Franks four-corners doctrine, 3 1 the district
court found that there was indeed probable cause to issue the warrant,
32
and thus upheld Hackney and Schwedland's contempt citations.
C.

Tenth Circuit Decision

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed Hackney's attempt to go
beyond the four-corners of the warrant application. Hackney argued
that the OSHA administrative plan upon which the inspection warrant
application was based was improperly promulgated, and thus improperly applied.3 3 Relying on Marshall v. Horn Seed Co. ,34 the court rejected
such an argument.
In Horn Seed, an administrative warrant was obtained based on spe-

cific employee complaints, rather than pursuant to an administrative
plan.3

5

When considering the validity of search warrants, the Tenth Circuit mentioned that courts may only review the information which was
before the magistrate. However, the Tenth Circuit did not go into any
36
analysis as to the efficacy of the four-corners doctrine.
In Robert K Bell Enterprises v. Donovan,3 7 however, the Tenth Circuit

did discuss its preference for requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies in challenging an administrative plan, 38 thus limiting a district
29. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 778. It is interesting to note that the court recognized
that a private individual realistically has no opportunity to challenge a search warrant until
after his home has been searched. The district court logically refused to allow businesses
the opportunity to challenge a warrant issued under a programmed inspection plan until
after the search has occurred. Id. at 778 n.3.
30. Id.
31. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. In Hackney, only a feeble attempt
was made to show "reckless disregard for the truth" or "deliberate falsehood." The district court summarily dismissed these assertions. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 778 & n.6.
32. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 779.
33. Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 769 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 1458 (1986).
34. 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1981). "In ruling on the validity of a search warrant, the
reviewing court may only consider the information provided the issuing magistrate or
judge." Id. at 104.
35. Id. at 98-103. The standards to be applied in determining probable cause for an
administrative warrant based on a specific allegation or complaint are somewhat different
from the standards applied to warrants based on administrative plans. When the warrant
is based on a specific complaint, the affidavit should include the name of the person who
received the complaint, the source of the complaint (though not necessarily the name of
the complainant), the underlying facts and circumstances surrounding the complaint, the
steps OSHA officials took to verify the complaint, personal observations, the past regulatory history of the employer, the number of prior entries, the scope of the search, and the
time of day it is to be performed. Id. at 102-03. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507
(1978).
36. "In ruling on the validity of a search warrant, the reviewing court may only consider the information provided the issuing magistrate or judge." Horn Seed, 647 F.2d at
104.
37. 710 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
38. Bell, 710 F.2d at 675; see supra text accompanying notes 18 & 21.
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court's review of a contempt citation to the four-corners of the warrant
application rather than the administrative underpinnings upon which
the warrant is based. Though Bell was not cited by the Tenth Circuit in
Hackney, the district court relied on that case in its decision. 39
The Tenth Circuit, in upholding Hackney's contempt citation,
found that ex parte warrants are to be "executed without delay and without prior notification ' 40 and should not have their execution hindered
by cumbersome discovery procedure. 4 1 This further strengthened the
requirement that the four-corners doctrine be adhered to in district
court contempt proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit next considered whether the magistrate acted on
probable cause in issuing the warrant authorizing the inspection of the
Hackney plant. 4 2 While noting that OSHA inspection warrants are issued on a lesser standard of probable cause, 4 3 the Tenth Circuit relied
on the probable cause test language contained in Camara v. Municipal
Court 4 4 and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.4 5 Accordingly, the court found that

the magistrate acted on probable cause in issuing the administrative
warrant. 4 6 The standard of review utilized by the Tenth Circuit in
reaching this conclusion was one of "substantial deference" to the magistrate's finding. 4 7 The Tenth Circuit extended the rule it pronounced
in United States v. Wood, 4 8 holding that such deference was "equally applicable" when considering the issuance of administrative warrants. 49
The Tenth Circuit thus affirmed all judgments of the district court.
D. Analysis
Any analysis of administrative search issues must begin with the
1978 United States Supreme Court case of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.50
Barlow's involved a warrantless OSHA search of the defendant's plumbing installation business. In Barlow's, the Supreme Court ruled that "[i]f
the government intrudes on a person's property, the privacy interest
suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations
39. Hackney, 583 F. Supp. at 777.
40. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 653 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316
(1978)).
41.

Id.

42. Id. at 652.
43. Id.
44. 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967) (Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are
to be issued for area code-enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's
belief that a particular dwelling violates the code but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole.).

45. 436 U.S. 307, 315-21 (1977) (Entitlement to a warrant will not depend on the
demonstration of probable cause that conditions on the premises violate OSHA but
merely that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment.).

46. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 652.
47. Id. at 653.
48. 695 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir. 1982) (magistrate's finding of probable cause to issue a criminal search warrant is entitled to substantial deference).
49. Hackney, 769 F.2d at 653.
50. 436 U.S. 307 (1977).
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of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards."' 5 1 A search warrant to inspect Barlow's business was therefore
52
required.
The Court in Barlow's did note that certain exceptions to the general
' 53
warrant requirement exist for "pervasively regulated business[es],
and for "closely regulated" industries "long subject to close supervision
and inspection." 5 4 In addition, administrative entry without a warrant
55
will be allowed in certain exigent circumstances.
In Barlow 's, the Supreme Court refused to allow a warrantless search
of employment facilities. Rather, the Court noted that a warrant must
be obtained pursuant to an administrative plan. 56 The issue in Hackney,
which was left open in Barlow's, involved the proper mode of challenging
warrants issued under administrative plans, and the appropriate form
for challenging the plans themselves. On this issue, the circuits are divided, some requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, 5 7 and
others allowing direct challenge beyond the four-corners of the warrant
in contempt proceedings. 5 8
As previously discussed, the Tenth Circuit has opted to apply the
four-corners doctrine to challenges of administrative search warrants in
contempt proceedings before the district court. 59 Therefore, any challenge to the constitutionality of an administrative plan underlying a
search warrant may only occur during an administrative enforcement
proceeding before the OSHRC, or on review of OSHRC's decision by a
court of appeals.
The courts which have required exhaustion of administrative remedies do so for one of two reasons. The first includes the traditional rationale for requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. This
traditional rationale emanates from theories, such as: the protection of
administrative autonomy; deference to agency expertise; easier judicial
review through creation of a factual record by the agency; and judicial
economy, given that the controversy may be mooted if the agency grants
51. Id. at 312.
52. Id. at 325.
53. Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (firearms
regulated under Gun Control Act)); see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (underground mines regulated under the Mine Safety and Health Act).
54. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313 (quoting Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor distribution)). The Eighth Circuit has extended this exception
to include inspections of drug manufacturers. See United States v. Jamieson-McKames
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
55. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (firefighters allowed to enter premises
without a warrant in order to extinguish a fire).
56. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321-23; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
57. See Brock v. Brooks Woolen Co., 782 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1986); Baldwin Metals
Co. v. Donovan, 642 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128 (3rd Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Central Mine Equipment
Co., 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc., 592
F.2d 611 (Ist Cir. 1979).
58. See Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
59. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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the relief sought. 60 The second reason for requiring exhaustion is an
equitable one - a court should simply refrain from exercising its equitable jurisdiction unless the challenging party clearly demonstrates that its
constitutional rights cannot be adequately adjudicated in the pending or
anticipated administrative enforcement proceeding against it. 6621 In
either case, federal appellate review is available upon exhaustion.
A criticism of the exhaustion approach is that although the procedure may ultimately protect the aggrieved party from citations based on
an invalid administrative plan, it does not protect against the unreasonable search itself.6 3 Some courts have recognized this problem, and will

thus only require exhaustion if the search has already occurred or if the
complaining party has commenced OSHRC proceedings. 64
The Occupational Safety and Health Act is a statute designed to
protect worker health and safety through regulatory powers, inspections, and enforcement proceedings. 6 5 When determining whether to
require exhaustion, courts must balance these statutory and regulatory
protections against the infringement of employer's constitutional rights
which would result from a bad plan underlying a search warrant. In
Hackney, the Tenth Circuit has favored worker health and safety over
what is a somewhat tenuous constitutional issue. Other courts have
gone the opposite way, while the Supreme Court has remained silent,
and will apparently remain so, given their recent denial of certiorari in
Hackney .66
II.

CONVERGENCE OF THE "SUBSTANTIAL
AND CAPRICIOUS"

EVIDENCE" AND "ARBITRARY

STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON QUESTIONS

INVOLVING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE:

THE URANIUM

MILL TAILINGS AND COMPOUND 1080 CASES

In two cases 6 7 challenging regulations issued under the Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), 68 and in another challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to lift restrictions on the use of a pesticide designed to kill coyotes, 6 9 the Tenth
60. Baldwin, 642 F.2d at 772; see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
61. Brock v. Brooks Woolen Co., 782 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1986); Marshall v. Central
Mine Equipment Co., 608 F.2d 719, 721-22 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Worksite Inspection of
Quality Products, Inc., 592 F.2d 611, 615 (1st Cir. 1979).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1982) (discussion ofjudicial review).
63. Weyerhauser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Hufihines
Steel Co., 488 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
64. Baldwin, 642 F.2d at 774 n.13. Compare Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall, 620
F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1980) (available administrative remedies does not preclude injunction
to avoid imminent threat of harm from continued inspections) with Babcock & Wilcox Co.
v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128 (3rd Cir. 1979) (exhaustion required if search has occurred).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982). See generally BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY,
LAw, AND POLICY (1984).

66. 106 S.Ct. 1458 (1986).
67. American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986); American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2022, 7901-7942 (1982).
69. National Cattlemen's Ass'n v. EPA, 773 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
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Circuit for the most part upheld the EPA's decisions over the objections
of competing industry/environmental and rancher/wildlife protection
interests. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit continued to show deference to
the agency's findings of scientific facts necessary to support administrative actions. Indeed, these three cases illustrate that when a court
reviews agency action based on scientific evidence, any distinction between the "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards of review may be illusory.
A.

The UMTRCA Cases
1.

Facts

70
The two companion cases of American Mining Congress v. Thomas
involved challenges to regulations promulgated by the EPA under the
71
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA).
Two separate sets of regulations were challenged, one set in each case.
In the first companion case, regulations controlling inactive uranium
mill tailings sites were challenged. 72 In the second companion case,
regulations controlling active uranium mill tailings sites were
73
questioned.
The regulations at issue in these two cases were promulgated to
combat the health hazards posed by uranium mill tailings. 74 The rules
issued by the EPA placed limits on radon released into the atmosphere
from the tailings piles, as well as limits on water contamination from the
piles. 7 5 In both situations, initial radon emission limits were set at 2

70. American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986) [hereinafter Inactive Sites]; American Mining Congress v.
Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986) [hereinafter Active Sites].
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2202, 7901-42 (1982).
72. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d 617.
73. Active Sites, 772 F.2d 640.
74. The purpose of UMTRCA is to:
provide a program of assessment and remedial action at [inactive mill tailings
sites] . . . including, where appropriate, the reprocessing of tailings to extract
residual uranium and other mineral values where practicable.... [and to provide]
a program to regulate mill tailings during uranium or thorium ore processing at
active mill operations and after termination of such operations in order to stabilize and control such tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner and to
minimize or eliminate radiation health hazards to the public.
42 U.S.C. § 7901(b) (1982).
Tailings are the residue from the uranium milling process. Health hazards arise from
the emission of radon gas from radium, a radioactive constituent of tailings. Radon and its
radioactive decay products may be potent carcinogens. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 621. Persons exposed to radon emissions from tailings piles may be subject to an increased risk of
contracting lung cancer. See 48 Fed. Reg. 19,584, 19,585-86 (1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 192.00-43) (proposed April 29, 1983). In addition to radon, uranium mill tailings piles
contain other hazardous constituents which may have toxic effects when ingested in either
food or water. These constituents include arsenic, lead, selenium, and molybdenum. I
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Standards for the Control of Byproduct Materials from Uranium Ore Processing at 3-8 (EPA, Sept. 1983).
75. 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.00-43 (1986); see also Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 622.
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pCi/m 2 /s. 76 After a lengthy comment period supported by extensive
technical studies and expert analysis, 7 7 the EPA issued its final "optimized cost-benefit" radon emission limit of 20 pCi/m 2 /s.

78

In arriving

at this standard, the EPA "evaluated a number of alternatives in terms of
79
their costs and the reductions achievable in potential health effects."
This selection method prompted environmental petitioners to question
the efficacy of the EPA's use of cost-benefit analysis to set radon emission standards aimed at protecting human health. 80 Industry petitioners, in contrast, contended that the regulations placed an undue fi81
nancial burden on an economically ailing industry.
2.

Issues Raised on Appeal
a.

Inactive Sites

In Inactive Sites, industry petitioners alleged that, in UMTRCA, Congress required the EPA to find a "significant risk" posed by uranium mill
tailings piles. Such a finding would serve as a trigger allowing for regulation in this area. Without such a finding, it was argued, regulations
could not be imposed. 8 2 The industry petitioners based their argument
83
on Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute.
American Petroleum Institute involved a challenge to Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) regulations designed to
protect workers from the potentially carcinogenic effects of the chemical
benzene.8 4 Justice Stevens, writing for the American Petroleum Institute
plurality, found that under the applicable statutory language, 8 5 OSHA
76. 46 Fed. Reg. 2556, 2562 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.00-.43) (proposed
April 22, 1980). The EPA stated that:
pCi/m 2-sec stands for picocuries per square meter per second, a measure of the
release rate of radioactivity from a surface. A curie is the amount of radioactive
material that produces 37 billion nuclear transformations per second. A
picocurie is a trillionth of a curie. One picocurie produces a little more than two
nuclear transformations per minute.
46 Fed. Reg. 2556, 2559 n.5 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.00-.43) (proposed April
22, 1980).
77. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 623.
78. 40 C.F.R. § 192.02 (1986).
79. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 624 (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 590 (1983) (codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 192.00-43) (summary of final rule)).
80. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 630-32.
81. Id.; see also United Nuclear Corp. v. EPA, decided sub nom American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 and American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2275, 2276 (1986). The EPA estimated active site cleanup
costs through the year 2000 to be between $310 million and $540 million. Active Sites, 772
F.2d at 646. Inactive site cleanup was estimated to be approximately 314 million (1981)
dollars. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 638.
82. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 627.
83. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
84. A causal connection is believed to exist between exposure to benzene and leukemia, a cancer of the white blood cells. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. at 613.
85. The applicable statutory language is found in section 652(8) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act which states:
The term "occupational safety and health standard" means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.
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must find, "as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question
poses a significant health risk in the workplace," prior to imposing a
86
regulation.
The industry petitioners in Inactive Sites argued that a similar requirement of finding a "significant risk" was envisioned by Congress
when it enacted UMTRCA. 8 7 The Tenth Circuit conceded that certain
language appearing in the legislative history of UMTRCA might suggest
that the EPA must find that radon poses a significant risk before regulating emission. 8 8 The court did not, however, find any language to this
effect in the conference committee report.8 9 In addition, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "[t]o hold that [the] EPA must determine that the
tailings piles pose a significant risk before regulating would change the
entire structure of the statute." 90 Thus, the court refused to impose a
significant risk standard, dismissing the industry petitioners' claims that
a finding of significant risk was required prior to regulation.
The next major issue raised by all petitioners involved the EPA's
use of a cost-benefit analysis 91 in arriving at the standards. Industry petitioners argued that the EPA failed to properly consider costs of disposal
and cleanup in light of what they perceived as limited health benefits of
the regulation. 9 2 In contrast, environmental petitioners claimed that
health-based standards under UMTRCA should be based primarily on
93
technical feasibility, and to a lesser extent on economic feasibility.
Environmental petitioners argued for an application of "feasibility
analysis," basing their assertions on American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan.94 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the
controlling section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 9 5 pre96
cluded a cost-benefit analysis.
29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982) (emphasis added).
86. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. at 614.
87. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7901(b) (1982) with 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982).
88. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 629 n.8 (citing 128 CONG. REc H8816 (daily ed. December 2, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Lujan) and 128 CONG. REC. S 13,055-56 (daily ed. October 1,
1982) (remarks of Sen. Wallop and Sen. Simpson)).
89. Id. at 629; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 884, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3592, 3603-21.

90. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 629 n.8.
91. "The label 'cost-benefit analysis' encompasses everything from a strict mathematical balancing formula to a less strict standard that merely requires the agency to recognize
both the costs and benefits of specific proposed alternatives and consider the differences in
choosing an appropriate alternative." Id. at 631.
92. Id. at 630.
93. Id. at 631. The language of the UMTRCA amendments clearly envisioned the
EPA's consideration of costs in arriving at the emission standards. "[T]he Administrator
shall consider the risk to public health, safety, and the environment, the environmental and
economic costs of applying such standards, and other factors as the Administrator determines to
be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
94. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982) (requiring health standards to be set at a point which
most adequately assures protection of worker health and safety).
96. The Supreme Court in Donovan found that Congress, in defining the relationship
between cost and benefits of the regulations, placed "the 'benefit' of worker health above
all other considerations save those making attainment of this 'benefit' unachievable." Donovan, 452 U.S. at 509. The Court explained that "[a]ny standard based on a balancing of
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The Tenth Circuit found that the operative language of UMTRCA,
which requires the EPA to consider "the environmental and economic
costs" of the standards, precluded feasibility analysis. 9 7 The court went
on to find that the "optimized cost benefit" approach adopted by the
EPA was a reasonable outgrowth of the statutory scheme envisioned by
Congress. 98
The court then considered whether the EPA's radium-in-soil concentration standards were valid. 99 Upon a review of the record, the
court concluded that there was nothing which would indicate that the
actions of the EPA in adopting these standards were arbitrary and
capricious. 100
The final standard considered by the court involved the limitations
set forth for the allowable level of indoor radon concentration. Initially,
the EPA had set this limit at 0.015 WL. l 0 l However, the EPA subsequently raised this limit to 0.03 WL, while merely requesting that a reasonable effort be made to achieve a level of 0.02 WL. 10 2 This change in
the allowable level of indoor radon concentration greatly increased the
risk of contracting cancer. 10 3 However, although the change in standards allowed a significant increase in the risk factor, the court determined that the EPA did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 10 4
After considering other minor issues, 10 5 the Tenth Circuit found an
costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit
analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is." Id.
97. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 631 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a) (1982)); see supra
note 93.
98. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 632.
99. Id. at 635.
100. Id.
101. 45 Fed. Reg. 27,370, 27,375 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 192.12(b)(1)) (proposed April 22, 1980). A working level or WL means "any combination of short-lived
radon decay products in one liter of air that will result in the ultimate emission of alpha
particles with a total energy of 130 billion electron volts." 40 C.F.R. § 192.11 (c) (1986).
102. 40 C.F.R. § 192.12(b)(1) (1986)
103. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 635-36. This change in radon concentration levels increased the risk of contracting lung cancer from 0.8 in 100 to approximately 1.3 in 100. Id.
at 636.
104. Id.at 636.
105. Another issue discussed by the court involved the area to which the emission limits applied. Industry petitioners argued that the EPA exceeded its authority by adopting
standards which were to be enforced inside the mill tailing sites. Id. The thrust of this
argument centered around the fact that the EPA's authority to promulgate environmental
standards was limited to locations outside of the mill tailings sites. Id. at 629-30. This
argument derives from the 1970 Reorganization Plan "which transferred the Atomic Energy Commission (now NRC) authority to set generally applicable environmental standards to the EPA." Id. at 629. However, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that since the mill
tailings sites are the sources of origin for radon gas, the EPA should have the power to
regulate the emission of radon gas from its source. As a result, the Tenth Circuit held that
the EPA did not exceed its authority. Id. at 630.
The court was also confronted with determining what documents could be reviewed.
The court determined that "extra-record" materials could be reviewed to see if they fell
within any accepted exceptions. Id. at 626-27. The court ultimately felt that reference
could be made to some of these extra-record materials, however, they could not be utilized
to supplement the record. The only document which was allowed to supplement the rec-
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error in the EPA's issuance of guidelines for control of waterborne pollutants. The EPA's proposed guidelines indicated that there was a problem with water contamination. In response to this problem, the EPA
initially proposed specific standards which were designed as a means of
generally regulating water quality. Pursuant to input received during
the comment period, the EPA discarded the proposed regulations,
adopting "site-specific" standards instead. 10 6 While scrutinizing this
drastic change in standards, the Tenth Circuit noted that the EPA acknowledged the existence of a problem with water contamination when
it initially suggested the adoption of specific standards designed to generally regulate water quality. 10 7 As a result, the Tenth Circuit remanded, holding that UMTRCA requires the EPA to adopt regulations
0 8
that have general application.1
b.

Active Sites

In attempting to spur the EPA into promulgating regulations, Congress, in a 1983 UMTRCA amendment, 10 9 set an October 1, 1983 deadline for promulgation of active mill site standards. If this deadline was
not met, the EPA's authority to set standards would terminate in favor of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ' 10 The EPA published proposed
standards for the active mill sites in the Federal Register on April 29,
1983.111 Final standards were signed by the EPA's Administrator on
September 30, 1983, and were apparently released to the public on that
day.' 1 2 The regulations were not published in the Federal Register,
however, until October 7, 1983.1 13
ord was a transmittal letter. This supplementation was allowed largely because the motion
to allow this document to supplement the record was unopposed. Id.
The court also faced the issue of whether the radon flux limits set by the EPA impermissibly limited the "engineering or design standard to be selected by the implementing
agency." Id. at 630. The court noted that although the EPA was only charged with the
responsibility of setting the standards, the emission limitations adopted were necessary in
order to comply with the mandate that it use a cost-benefit analysis. The court reasoned,
that to some extent, the EPA was required to consider methods of implementation in order to effectively complete its cost-benefit analysis. Id.
106. Id. at 638. Compare 46 Fed. Reg. 2556, 2562 (1981) (codified in 40 C.F.R.
§§ 192.00-.43) (general standards proposed April 22, 1980) with 48 Fed. Reg. 590, 593-95
(1983) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 192.02) (rationale for abandonment of proposed general
standards). The "site specific" standards required each site to be tested, with corrective
measures to be ascertained after such testing.
107. Inactive Sites, 772 F.2d at 638-39.
108. Id. at 638.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(1) (1982). See infra note 110.
110. The amendment provides as follows:
If the Administrator [of the EPA] fails to promulgate standards in final form
under this subsection by October 1, 1983, the authority of the Administrator to
promulgate such standards shall terminate, and the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission may take actions under this chapter without regard to any provision of
this chapter requiring such actions to comply with, or be taken in accordance
with, standards promulgated by the Administrator.
42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(1) (1982).
111. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 643; 40 C.F.R. § 192.30 (1986).
112. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 643.
113. Id.; 40 C.F.R. §§ 192.30-43 (1986).
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Publication of the active mill site standards on October 7, 1983
provided several of the industry petitioners with an opportunity to
challenge the EPA's jurisdictional authority by claiming that such regulations were "promulgated" beyond the statutory deadline."14 Petitioner's claim equated "promulgation" with publication in the Federal
Register.' 15
The Tenth Circuit agreed that the cases cited by the petitioners
hold that statute of limitations provisions for seeking judicial review be6
gin to run on the date rules are published in the Federal Register."
However, the court acknowledged that " 'promulgation' does not have a
single accepted meaning in all contexts."' 17 The court then went on to
find that the September 30 signing and release of the regulations constituted "promulgation" sufficient to satisfy the congressional deadline.'' 8
It is important to note that, in the Active Sites case, the Tenth Circuit
reaffirmed several of the holdings which were set forth in the Inactive
Sites case.' 19 However, unlike the water standards adopted to regulate

inactive sites, the EPA adopted a two-part groundwater standard for active sites.12 0 Not only did the court determine that the EPA adopted the
required general standards, but it also held that the EPA exhibited adequate effort to respond to the concerns of both the environmental petitioners and the industry petitioners during the comment period. As a
result, the court held that the EPA's water standards for active mill sites
was valid. 121

Finally, the Tenth Circuit denied standing to one of the petitioners,
AMAX, Inc. 122 AMAX challenged the EPA's designation of molybdenum as a hazardous constituent of uranium and thorium mill tailings,' 23
claiming that such designation subjected molybdenum to groundwater
protection standards. However, neither AMAX nor any of its customers
owned or operated any mill tailing sites. 1 24 The regulations specifically
114. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 644.
115. Id. at 645. Petitioners' argument was based on two cases. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court held that a district
court's order to "promulgate" regulations was satisfied by publication of such regulations
in the Federal Register. Id. at 813. In Laminators Safety Glass Ass'n v. Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n, 578 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court, for purposes of determining the
effective date for calculating a statute of limitations, implicitly equated the date of Federal
Register publication with the date of promulgation. Id. at 408.
116. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 645. See Laminators Safety Glass Ass n, 578 F.2d at 408-11.
117. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 645.
118. Id.
119. The court again held:
that a finding by the EPA of a 'significant risk' is not a prerequisite to promulgating the regulations; . . . that the EPA may promulgate standards to apply within
the boundaries of the millsites; . . . that the EPA's standards do not unlawfully
impose management, design, and engineering requirements; . . . and that the
EPA properly considered cost-benefit factors in establishing standards.
Id. at 645-46. In addition, the arbitrary and capricious issue was not rediscussed.
120. 40 C.F.R. § 192.32(a)(l)-(2) (1986).
121. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 648-49.
122. Id. at 649. AMAX is "one of the world's leading producers of molybdenum." Id.
123. Id. at 650.
124. Id.
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state that molybdenum is listed as a hazardous constituent "only for
12 5
purposes of controlling uranium and thorium byproduct materials."'
the regTherefore, AMAX's molybdenum holdings were not covered 2by
6
ulations and the court accordingly denied AMAX standing.'
c.

Standard of Review

In both Inactive Sites and Active Sites, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the
EPA's rulemaking record to determine whether its decision was arbitrary
and capricious. 1 27 Except for the remand of the groundwater guidance
standards in Inactive Sites, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the EPA's decisions
in both Active Sites and Inactive Sites, thus showing substantial deference
to the EPA's expertise in a highly technical field.
B.

The Compound 1080 Case
1. Background

In National Cattleman's Association v. EPA, 12 8 the EPA was caught between competing challenges of the Defenders of Wildlife and those of a
number of livestock industry trade associations.
Prior to 1972, Compound 1080 was one of the primary substances
used by ranchers to kill coyotes and other predators of livestock. In
1972, the EPA determined that Compound 1080 was leading to a substantial number of deaths of non-target, non-predatory animals. 12 9 Pursuant to its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),13 0 the EPA cancelled the registration of Com3
pound 1080 for use as a predacide.' '
Regulations promulgated under FIFRA allow the Administrator to
reconsider a prior cancellation of a pesticide in light of any "substantial
125. Id.
126. The Tenth Circuit relied on National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980), in which it held that a plaintiff must allege that he has been or
will be "perceptibly harmed" by an agency action, "not that he can imagine circumstances
in which he could be affected by the agency's action." Id. at 1387 (quoting United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973)). The Tenth Circuit found that the regulatory impact of UMTRCA was so far removed from the harm AMAX was alleging, that standing did
not exist. Active Sites, 772 F.2d at 652.
127. The standard of review applied by the Tenth Circuit was the arbitrary and capricious test. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982). Under this standard, the court reviews the evidence "to determine whether the agency decision was rational and based on consideration
of the relevant factors." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976). As a result, the reviewing court may not "substitute its judgment for that
of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971). A court may reverse, however, upon a finding that the agency made a clear error
ofjudgment. Id.
128. 773 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
129. Id. at 269.
130. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-y (1982). Section 136d(b) of FIFRA allows the EPA's Administrator to cancel or modify the registration of a registered pesticide if it is found to have
"unreasonable adverse effects" on the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1982). Procedures for this process are codified in 40 C.F.R. § 164.1-.133 (1986).
131. National Cattleman's Ass'n, 773 F.2d at 269; see 37 Fed. Reg. 5720 (1972) (administrative notice disallowing the use of Compound 1080 for predacide purposes).
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new evidence" which was not available at the time of cancellation.' 3 2 In
1972, Compound 1080 was predominantly administered in large bait
stations.13 3 By 1982, two new means of administering the pesticide had
134
been developed: single lethal dose baits (SLD) and toxic collars.
These new distribution methods precipitated a 1982 hearing to determine whether they constituted "substantial new evidence" sufficient to
35
require a reversal or modification of the 1972 suspension order.'
As a result of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
found that the advent of toxic collars and SLDs did constitute substantial new evidence, thereafter lifting the ban on use of Compound 1080
when administered by these methods. 136 However, the ALJ imposed
certain restrictions on the use of toxic collars and SLDs, 13 7 while maintaining the ban on large bait stations.
On appeal to the Administrator, the ALJ's ban on large bait stations
was upheld and additional restrictions on the use of SLDs and toxic collars were imposed. 13 8 Both the Defenders of Wildlife and the National
Cattleman's Association appealed the Administrator's decision to the
Tenth Circuit.
2.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

The Defenders of Wildlife asserted that the Administrator's decision to lift the ban on Compound 1080 was not supported by substantial
new evidence. The National Cattleman's Association, on the other
hand, questioned the EPA's restrictions on the use of SLD baits as well
139
as the EPA's refusal to lift the ban on large bait stations.
The statute requires a reviewing court to sustain the Administrator's decision if it is "supported by substantial new evidence when con132.

40 C.F.R. § 164.132(a) (1986).

133. "A large bait station consists of a fifty to one-hundred-pound portion of horse or
sheep carcass impregnated with Compound 1080. These bait stations [are] set out during
the winter and early spring in rangelands suffering from heavy predation by coyotes."
National Cattleman's Ass'n, 773 F.2d at 270.
134. "An SLD consists of a bite-size piece of meat or other material containing a lethal

dose of Compound 1080 which is placed in a location where it is likely to be taken by a
coyote and not likely to be consumed by non-target wildlife ....

Toxic collars consist of

rubber collars with small reservoirs filled with Compound 1080." Id. These collars are
worn by sheep or goats. Coyotes generally strike at an animal's throat, and are thereby
exposed to a lethal dose of 1080. Id.
135. Id. at 269; see 40 C.F.R. § 164.132(a) (1986) (allows reversal or modification).
136. National Cattleman's Ass'n, 773 F.2d at 270.
137. The Administrative Law Judge's order required that all Compound 1080 uses be
supervised by a federal agency. This requirement was reviewed by the Tenth Circuit. See
infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text. "Collars could be filled and distributed only by
registered users and only administered by certified applicators." SLD baits could only be
prepared and distributed by certified state or federal employees. National Cattleman'sAss 'n,
773 F.2d at 270.
138. Under the Administrator's decision, the certification of SLD applicators would be
run solely by the federal government. Additional testing under experimental use permits
would also be required. With respect to toxic collars, additional labelling and usage requirements were imposed. Id. at 270.
139. Id. at 270-71.
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sidered on the record as a whole."' 140 With regard to the two new
delivery methods, the Tenth Circuit found that the EPA's decision was
supported by the requisite substantial new evidence in the record. 141
The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the EPA's requirement that a
federal agency determine the competency of and certify all users of SLD
baits. The court held that this requirement exceeded the EPA's statutory authority since FIFRA allows states to adopt certification plans for
43
applicators. 14 2 Such plans, however, must be approved by the EPA."
The Tenth Circuit found that the EPA's requirement of mandatory federal agency certification would have the effect of rejecting state certification plans prior to their submission, thus contravening the statute., 44 In
all other respects, the EPA Administrator's decision was affirmed.145
C.

Analysis

In the three cases discussed above, the Tenth Circuit deferred to
the EPA's expertise with regard to its interpretations of scientific evidence. In spite of this deference, it is important to note that the
UMTRCA cases were reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard," 4 6 while the Compound 1080 decision was reviewed under the substantial evidence test. " 4 7 Indeed, it is often difficult to distinguish the
requisite quantity of evidence needed to uphold a given decision under
either of these tests," 4 8 particularly when the agency action under re140. Id. at 271 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (1982)). "Substantial evidence 'is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Id. at 270 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NRLB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
141. Id. at 271.
142. 7 U.S.C. § 136b(a)(2) (1982) reads:
If any State, at any time, desires to certify applicators of pesticides, the Governor
of such State shall submit a State plan for such purpose. The Administrator shall
approve the plan submitted by any State, or any modification thereof, if such plan
in his judgment(A) designates a State agency responsible for administering the plan
throughout the State;
(B) contains satisfactory assurances that such agency has or will have the
legal authority and qualified personnel necessary to carry out the plan;
(C) gives satisfactory assurances that the State will devote adequate funds to
the administration of the plan;
(D) provides that the State agency will make such reports to the Administrator in such form and containing such information as the Administrator may from
time to time require; and
(E) contains satisfactory assurances that State standards for the certification
of applicators of pesticides conform with those standards prescribed by the Administrator under paragraph (1) [of this section]. Any State certification program
under this section shall be maintained in accordance with the State plan approved
under this section.
143. Id.
144. National Cattleman'sAss'n, 773 F.2d at 272.
145. Id. at 273.
146. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
148. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973):
[Ilt is difficult to imagine a decision having no substantial evidence to support it
which is not 'arbitrary', or a decision struck down as arbitrary which is in fact
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view is based on scientific expertise.' 49 Thus, in these cases, judicial
scrutiny was limited to review for compliance with statutory authority
and review for procedural compliance. 150 The Tenth Circuit exhibited
almost complete deference to the agency's findings, ensuring only that
the agency decision was supported by some evidence.
In these three cases, the Tenth Circuit's decision to strike down
certain aspects of the agency's decisions' 5' was based on the EPA's attempt to engage in ultra vires actions. 152 The court, after its purported
"searching inquiry" into the facts, affirmed the EPA's scientific judgment in all three cases. While it is not suggested that these Tenth Circuit decisions should have been decided differently, it may be that the
Tenth Circuit's reluctance to scrutinize scientific evidence' 5 3 blurs any
distinction that exists between the arbitrary and capricious test and the
substantial evidence test.
This deference reflects the judiciary's preference to rely on the scientific expertise concentrated in the agency. Such deference may be
most pronounced where the court, like the agency, finds itself caught
between competing interests. Each litigant, sophisticated in the scientific bases of a given regulatory option, may muster their experts to refute an agency choice which has been arrived at through the use of a
technically trained staff. Use of skilled agency professionals, however, is
supported by 'substantial evidence' . . . in the review of rules of general applicability made after notice and comment rulemaking, the two criteria do tend to
converge.
The primary difference according to the Administrative Procedure Act is that the substantial evidence test applies to "on the record hearings," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982), while
the arbitrary and capricious test applies to informal rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1982). See Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); Associated Industries, 487 F.2d at 349-50.
149. When scientific or highly specialized subjects are involved, wide-ranging judicial
review may strain the technical competence of the court. Levin, Scope of Review Doctrine
Restated. An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 260 (1986). "When
available technological data and research are unfamiliar or untried, the Agency necessarily
enjoys broad discretion." Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1236 (10th
Cir. 1979); see BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 647 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980). When a court is reviewing an area "fraught with scientific
uncertainty," the judicial review function encounters "significant limitations in the substantive aspect." Id. (quoting Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
150. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); CF&I
Steel Corp. v. Economic Dev. Admin., 624 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1980).
151. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (guidance standards in the
UMTRCA cases); notes 142-44 and accompanying text (the exclusive Federal agency determination of competency and power to certify users of SLD baits).
152. With regard to the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the groundwater guidance standards in Inactive Sites, it is unnecessary to decide whether the court's rejection was based on
either statutory or procedural deficiencies. It is sufficient, for the purposes of this argument, to note that the decision was not based on an extensive review of, or inquiry into,
the scientific evidence. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
153. This reluctance to scrutinize scientific evidence is by no means out of line with
accepted standards. As Justice O'Connor said in Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), "a reviewing court must remember that
the Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers
of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple
findings of fact, a reviewing court must be at its most deferential." Id. at 103.
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the purpose of rulemaking procedures. 15 4 It would be unreasonable, if
not erroneous, for a court to pick a side in a scientific debate among
experts.1 55 Thus, the logical result, as exemplified by the Tenth Circuit
decisions discussed herein, is deference to the administrative agency's
"middle ground," regardless of the legal standard by which the agency
decision is reviewed.
III.

JOINING THE SOCIAL SECURITY/UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
OFFSET BANDWAGON: EDWARDS V. VALDEZ

In Edwards v. Valdez, 15 6 the Tenth Circuit reversed Judge Weinshienk's district court opinion,' 57 thereby upholding nearly identical
federal and state provisions allowing unemployment benefits received
by those who have begun to collect their social security pensions to be
offset by the monthly amount of social security received. This decision
brought the Tenth Circuit into accord with all other federal circuits that
158
have construed the federal statute at issue.
A.

The District Court Opinion

Edwards involved three Colorado residents who began to receive social security benefits upon retirement. Each of these three individuals
subsequently acquired new employment, became unemployed, and filed
for unemployment benefits. Pursuant to their interpretation of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),1 59 the defendants deducted each
154. See O'Brien, Marbury, the APA, and Science-Policy Disputes: The Alluring and Elusive
Judicial/AdministrativePartnership, 7 HARV. J. OF L. AND PUB. POL'Y 443 (1984).
155. For a different characterization of these issues, see Stever, Deference to Administrative
Agencies in Federal Environmental, Health, and Safety Litigation-Thoughts on VaryingJudicial Application of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 35 (1983).
156. 789 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1986).
157. Edwards v. Valdez, 602 F. Supp. 361 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 789 F.2d 1477 (10th
Cir. 1986).
158. See Peare v. McFarland, 778 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1985); Mayberry v. Adams, 745
F.2d 729 (lst Cir. 1984); Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984); Bowman v.
Stumbo, 735 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1984); Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
159. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1982). The FUTA section applied in Edwards reads:
[T]he amount of compensation payable to an individual for any week which
begins after March 31, 1980, and which begins in a period with respect to which
such individual is receiving a governmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the
previous work of such individual shall be reduced (but not below zero) by an
amount equal to the amount of such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity,
or other payment, which is reasonably attributable to such week except that(A) the requirements of this paragraph shall apply to any pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or other similar periodic payment only if(i) such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar payment is
under a plan maintained (or contributed to) by a base period employer (as determined under applicable law), and
(ii) in the case of such a payment not made under the Social Security Act
or the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (or the corresponding provisions of prior
law), services performed for such employer by the individual after the beginning
of the base period (or remuneration for such services) affect eligibility for, or
increase the amount of, such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar payment, and

1987]

ADMINISTRATIVE LA W

plaintiffs' social security benefits from their unemployment benefits.
160
Plaintiffs challenged this interpretation.
Consequently, the primary issue in Edwards was the construction of
section 3304(a)(15)(A)(i) of FUTA and a similar Colorado provision. 16 1
These provisions allow a state to "offset unemployment compensation
by the amount of social security benefits received whenever the 'base
period' employer participates in the social security program."' 6 2 One
of the likely reasons for the enactment of this provision was the preven63
tion of 'double-dipping.'
Plaintiffs' primary claim was that section 3304(a)(15) of FUTA only
applied to persons who worked for a base period employer, retired, and
then went back to work for the same employer for the time necessary to
become eligible for unemployment compensation. The district court
agreed that such a construction could be inferred from the statutory language, 164 thus concluding that the language was "ambiguous." 165 This
conclusion forced the court to resort to the legislative history in order to
166
determine the meaning of the statutory provision.
The most compelling evidence supporting the construction urged
by the plaintiffs was a statement by Senator Bradley which indicated that
it would be possible for an individual to lose his unemployment benefits
during the offsetting process if the individual's pension benefits were
higher than his unemployment benefits.1 6 7 Indeed, Judge Weinshienk
(B) the State law may provide for limitations on the amount of any such a
reduction to take into account contributions made by the individual for the pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or other similar periodic payment;
26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15) (1982).
160. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1478.
161. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-110 (Supp. 1986) reads in pertinent part:
(3)(a) An individual's weekly benefit amount shall be reduced (but not below
zero) by the prorated weekly amount of a primary insurance benefit under Title II
or the federal "Social Security Act," a pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity,
or any other similar periodic payment from a plan or fund which has been contributed to by a base period employer.
162. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1479. "The 'base period' is the period of time an employee
must be employed before he is eligible for unemployment benefits. The 'base period employer' . . . is the employer who paid wages during this eligibility period." Id. at 1479 n.2.
163. "'[D]ouble-dipping' in this context refers to the collection of both pension benefits and unemployment benefits based on the same period of work and contributions by
the same employer." Id. at 1479 n.5.
164. "One logical meaning of [29 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15)] (A)(i) would be that social security payments are offset only if the base period employer was one who 'contributed to'
the social security benefits of the specific employee before retirement." Edwards, 602 F.
Supp. at 364 (D. Colo. 1985).
165. Id. at 365.
166. The general rule is that where the plain language of the statute is clear, resort
should not be had to the legislative history. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 183 n.29 (1978); Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). It is only where an ambiguity in the statutory language exists that the legislative history should be consulted. Nichols
v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 195 F.2d 428, 431 (10th Cir. 1952). The Tenth Circuit, by its
own admission, has been far from consistent in applying these general rules. Edwards, 789
F.2d at 1481 n.7.
167. Senator Bradley stated:
A worker at company A retires at age 65 after 35 years of service there and begins
collecting a pension of $600 per month. He unsuccessfully seeks new employment and files an unemployment insurance claim. The State computes this indi-
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accorded great weight to these remarks. 16 8 As such, she concluded that
"Congress intended social security benefits to be offset only if the base
period employer was the same as the social security employer and not
when the base period employer merely participates in the federal social
were not
security system."' 169 She, therefore, held that the plaintiffs
0
subject to the offset provisions of section 3304(a)(15).17
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

When construing section 3304(a)(15)(A)(i), the Tenth Circuit ignored the inconsistent language in the legislative history,171 finding the
language to be "clear and unambiguous."' 72 The majority concluded
that "[t]he language of the statute, standing alone, compels only one
interpretation: that social security benefits offset unemployment bene17 3
fits if the base period employer makes social security contributions."'
In reviewing plaintiffs' equal protection claims, the Tenth Circuit
found the classification justified by the governmental interests of fiscal
integrity, ease of administration, diminished possibility of truly retired
workers collecting unemployment, and the prevention of a requirement
that would force employers to fund two wage-replacement programs for
74
the same period of employment. 1
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 175 Judge
Seymour dissented, finding that the language of the statute was ambiguous, and further concluded that the legislative history supported the dis76
trict court's conclusions.'
C.

Analysis

The Tenth Circuit's Edwards decision is consistent with decisions of
all other federal cirtuits that have looked at section 3304(a)(15), 177 as
well as the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the provision. 17 8 In
vidual's unemployment benefit rate at $130 per week, or $520 per month,
because of the past earnings reported to the State. This individual would not be
eligible for unemployment insurance payments, because the amount of the pension received from the base period employer exceeded the unemployment insurance payments that were to be paid.
126 CONG. REC. 26,041 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1980) (remarks of Senator Bradley).
168. Edwards, 602 F. Supp. at 368; see generally North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("Remarks ...of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted
are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction.").
169. Edwards, 602 F. Supp. at 369.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
172. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1481.
173. Id.
174. Edwards, 789 F.2d at 1483.
175. Id. at 1484.
176. Id. (Seymour, J., dissenting).
177. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
178. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905
(1982); Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81 (Change 1), 47 Fed. Reg.
29,908 (1982); Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81 (Revised Change 2), 48
Fed. Reg. 37,740 (1983) (revokes Change I and reinstates the position stated in original
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Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (UIPL) 7-8 1, the Secretary interpreted section 3304(a)(15)(A)(i) to allow states to deduct "dollar for
dollar, the amount of any pension payment received without regard to
the proportion of base period wages that may have been paid by the
79
employer who contributed to or maintained the pension."1
The Secretary also interpreted the pension offset provision to be
the minimum deduction required by federal law. Under this interpretation, states are free to broaden the scope of deductions of pension payments beyond this federal minimum.' 8 ° In Watkins v. Cantrell,' 8 1 the
Fourth Circuit looked at the statutory language, the legislative history,
and the Secretary's interpretation of section 3304(a)(15) to conclude
that the State of Virginia's pension offset provision,' 8 2 which offset unemployment benefits in excess of the amounts required to be offset by
section 3304(a)(15), did not contravene the statutory requirements of
FUTA. 1

83

Three other federal circuits which have interpreted section
3304(a)(15) under similar fact situations have arrived at the same conclusion as the Tenth Circuit.' 8 4 Furthermore, recent district court decisions have been consistent with the federal circuit opinions.' 8 5 It
therefore seems fair to conclude that social security and other pension
benefits may be offset from unemployment insurance benefits, though
the extent of these offsets will vary according to the laws of the individual states.
IV.

GOOD TIMING FINALITY OF JUDGMENT, MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION, AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS IN FILING
APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

In C.O.D.E., Inc. v. ICC, 1 8 6 and Smith v. Mlarsh, 18 7 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the issue of timeliness in filing appeals for judicial review of
Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905 (1982) which
allows "[s]tates greater latitude in taking into account an unemployed individual's contributions to a pension fund"); see also Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that this directive, with the exception of Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No.
7-81 (Change 1), 47 Fed. Reg. 29,908 (1982), was an interpretative rule, thus not subject
to the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act).
179. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905 (1982).
180. "Although a State may broaden the scope of its deduction of pension payments
beyond the conditions in which deduction is required under the Federal law, it may not
adopt less stringent conditions which fall short of the Federal requirements." Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 7-81, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,905, 29,906 (1982).
181. 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Note, Federal Pension Offset Provisions: Minimum Standardor Federal Mandate?, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (1985) (discussing Watkins).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.1-48.1 (1950 & Supp. 1987).

183. Watkins, 736 F.2d at 946.
184. See Peare v. McFarland, 778 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1985); Bowman v. Stumbo, 735
F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1984); Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1099 (1984).
185. See, e.g., Bleau v. Hackett, 598 F. Supp. 727 (D. R.I. 1984); Duso v. Ratoff, 600 F.
Supp. 3 (D. N.H. 1983).
186. 768 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1985).
187. 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1986).
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administrative agency decisions. In both cases, the Tenth Circuit found
that the petitions for review were filed in a timely manner. In C.O.D.E.,
the Tenth Circuit decided that the filing of a discretionary appeal to the
agency tolled the statute of limitations for appeal to the court. This allowed for court review if the petitioner filed its appeal within sixty days
of the agency's denial of the discretionary appeal. '8 8 In Smith, the court
found that refusal by a military review board to upgrade an undesirable
discharge was a separate administrative action, distinct from the original
discharge decision, and thus reviewable on a petition filed within the
statutory time period. 189 The two cases raise issues regarding the finality of agency action, the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the effect of motions for reconsideration on limitation of action provisions,
the exercise of the court's equitable jurisdiction, and the tendency of
courts to favor judicial review.
A.

C.O.D.E. v. ICC

In C.O.D.E., the petitioner sought review of an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) decision allowing a competing company to
operate as a common carrier. The initial decision was made by the
Commission's Review Board No. 2, which held that petitioners "failed to
demonstrate that [the Board's] grant of the application would be inconsistent with public convenience and necessity."' 90 C.O.D.E. then appealed to Commission Division 1, which denied its appeal. 19 1 Finally,
C.O.D.E. filed a discretionary appeal to the full commission, seeking to
have portions of the case declared as matters of General Transportation
Importance (GTI). 19 2 This appeal was also denied.
Regarding the statute of limitations, section 2344 of the Administrative Orders Review Act (the Hobbs Act) requires any party aggrieved
by an agency decision to seek judicial review within sixty days after a
final agency order is entered. 193 This statutory review provision is jurisdictional,i 9 4 and may not be altered or enlarged by the court. 19 5 There188. COD.E., 768 F.2d at 1212.
189. Smith, 787 F.2d at 511-12.
190. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1211.
191. Id.
192. Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 10322(g)(2)(A) (Supp. 1986) provides that:
"The Commission may grant a rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of an action
of the Commission that was taken by a division or an employee board designated by the
Commission if it finds that(A) the action involved a matter of general transportation importance ......
See also 49 C.F.R. 11 15.3(b)(2) (1986) (matters of general transportation importance as a
prerequisite to an administrative appeal).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970) provides in part that:
On the entry of a final order reviewable under this chapter, the agency shall
promptly give notice thereof by service or publication in accordance with its
rules. Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry,
file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.
194. Failure to file within the statutory time period will therefore divest the court of its
powers of review. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
666 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chem-Haulers, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 610 (5th Cir.
1976); Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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fore, the primary issue before the Tenth Circuit in CO. D.E. was whether
the petitioner's appeal should have been filed following the decision of
Division 1 (in which case the action would have been barred as untimely), or whether filing within sixty days of the denial of the discretion19 6
ary appeal to the full commission allowed judicial review.
In deciding this issue, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Eighth Circuit
case of B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. ICC. 19 7 In McAdams, a motion for reconsid-

eration was filed by McAdams on September 19, 1975, after his application to transport candy and confections was denied on August 12, 1975.
This petition was ultimately denied by the Commission. The notice of
denial was served on McAdams on January 7, 1976. Subsequently, on
January 15, 1976, McAdams filed a petition requesting a declaration that
certain issues were matters of general transportation importance. This
petition was also denied by the Commission. McAdams was served with
notice of the denial on February 3, 1976. McAdams filed a petition for
court review on March 31, 1976.198 The issue presented to the Eighth
Circuit was when the 60 day limitation period began to run. The court
held that although the GTI petition was not necessary for purposes of
exhaustion, the 60 day time period began to run from the date of its
denial. 199

The Tenth Circuit, following the McAdams decision, concluded that
requiring an appeal to be filed with the court prior to the Commission's
ruling on a discretionary appeal would be premature. 20 0 The court thus
held that "[i]t is in the interest ofjudicial economy and agency responsibility to allow the Commission to reconsider its orders

. . .

rather than to

'20 1
compel an applicant to invoke immediate judicial review.
In making its determination, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
C.O.D.E. from Selco Supply Co. v. EPA. 20 2 In Selco, the Tenth Circuit held
that a motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of a sixty day
statute of limitations imposed by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 20 3 The court held that Selco was distinguishable from CO.D.E. on policy grounds, since "resolution of EPA orders
under FIFRA, like orders under other environmental protection stat'20 4
utes, should be made promptly."

195. Chen-Haulers, 536 F.2d at 614; see FED. R. App. P. 26(b) which provides in part that:
[The court of appeals may not] enlarge the time prescribed by law for filing a
petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, modify, enforce, or otherwise review, or a
notice of appeal from, an order of an administrative agency, board, commission
or officer of the United States, except as specifically authorized by law.
196. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1211.
197. 551 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1977).
198. Id. at 1114.
199. Id. at 1114-15.
200. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1211 (citing McAdams, 551 F.2d at 1115).
201. Id. (quoting McAdams, 551 F.2d at 1115). For a discussion of similar policy reasons for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, see supra notes 18 & 60-64 and
accompanying text.
202. 632 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
203. Id. at 865; see Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136(n)(b) (1982).
204. CO.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1212 (quoting Selco, 632 F.2d at 863). Judge Seymour con-
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Here, the court held that C.O.D.E.'s appeal was filed in a timely
manner. However, in reaching this conclusion, the court noted that decisions as to the tolling of the statutes of limitations of agencies other
20 5
than the ICC were not controlling.
B.

Smith v. Marsh
1. Administrative Proceedings and the District Court's Decision

Smith v. Marsh 20 6 involved the refusal of a military review board to
20 7
upgrade the status of a former serviceman's undesirable discharge.
Mr. Smith's first claim was that the Army's 1971 denial of his conscientious objector application was improper and that his constitutional and
regulatory rights had been violated.2 0 8 He further claimed that the subsequent reviews of the 1971 decision, by the Army Discharge Review
Board (ADRB) and Army Board for Correction of Military Records
(ABCMR) denying his upgrade, were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence.2 0 9 The district court agreed with the
2 10
latter claim, and the Army appealed.
2.

Tenth Circuit Decision

The Army's primary contention on appeal was that each of Mr.
Smith's claims were time-barred by 28 U.S.C. sec. 2401(a). 2 1 1 The
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court, finding that the petitioner's
first claim was time-barred since it accrued in 1972.212 It also affirmed
the trial court's acceptance of Smith's second claim, holding that the
statute of limitations began to toll in 1983.213 Review of this decision
curred with the Selco majority opinion, yet took issue with the majority's adoption of a
separate, stricter rule denying the tolling of the statute of limitations for EPA orders under
FIFRA. "Prompt resolution of environmental orders is an important goal. It is not selfevident, however, that there is a lesser need for quick determination of issues before ...
the Interstate Commerce Commission." Selco, 632 F.2d at 866 (Seymour, J., concurring).
205. C.O.D.E., 768 F.2d at 1212.
206. 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1986).
207. Id. John Smith received an undesirable discharge from the U.S. Army in 1972. In
1980, Smith applied to the Army Discharge Review Board (ADRB) to have his discharge
upgraded. The ADRB denied his claim. Mr. Smith then applied to the Army Board for
Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), which also denied his claim in November 1983.
Id. at 510-11.
208. Id. at 511.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1982) states in part that: "[E]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years after the right of action first accrues."
212. Smith, 787 F.2d at 511.
213. Id. at 512. The Tenth Circuit, in reaching this conclusion, relied on Geyen v.
Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985), a case which was "practically indistinguishable on
its facts from [Smith]." Smith, 787 F.2d at 511. In Geyen, the Fifth Circuit found that
Geyen's first cause of action, in which he challenged his "activation and the Army's denial
of his hardship applications," Geyen, 775 F.2d at 1308, was barred by the six-year statute of
limitations. Geyen's second cause of action, in which he alleged "that the ABCMR's 1982
decision denying him an upgraded discharge was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by
substantial evidence and erroneous in law," Id., was not time barred since it accrued at the
time of the 1982 ABCMR decision. d. at 1309.
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was therefore not time-barred. The Tenth Circuit then found that the
ABCMR's decision was indeed arbitrary and capricious, and affirmed the
trial court's order requiring the Army to issue Mr. Smith an honorable
2 14
discharge.
In Smith, the Tenth Circuit refused to follow the rule most recently
expressed in Hurick v. Lehman. 2 15 In Hurick, the Federal Circuit held that
"the failure of the Correction Board to set aside a military discharge
does not give rise to a separate and independent claim, since that action
is merely ancillary to the discharge that the former serviceman is seeking
2 16
to change."
C. Analysis
Statutes of limitations represent a "legislative judgment that it is
unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend [an action] within
a specified period of time, and that 'the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.' "217 In the
administrative law context, time limits impart "finality into the administrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources and the
reliance interests of those who might conform their conduct to administrative regulations. ' 2 18 Although the federal courts have recognized
these concerns, they have not applied statutory time limits in a consistent manner.
The Tenth Circuit's Smith decision, when contrasted with the Federal Circuit's Hurick decision, exemplifies how a differing characterization of an agency action may either allow review of or bar identical
claims. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit's CO.D.E. and Selco decisions demonstrate how a motion for reconsideration in one instance may toll the
22 0
statute of limitations, 2 19 while in another instance, it may not.
Other considerations, such as ripeness, 2 2 1 the application of a rule
214. Smith, 787 F.2d at 512.
215. 782 F.2d 984 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
216. Id. at 987.
217. U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Railroad Tel. v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
218. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. ICC, 720 F.2d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 1983); see also
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 666 F.2d 595, 602
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
219. See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532 (1970) (motion
for reconsideration upheld); Pennsylvania v. ICC, 590 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (motion
for reconsideration tolled statute of limitations); Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) ("Where a motion for rehearing is in fact filed there is no final action until the
hearing is denied.").
220. See also NRDC, 666 F.2d at 602 (sixty day period for seeking judicial review may
not be enlarged by courts); Provisioners Frozen Express, Inc. v. ICC, 536 F.2d 1303 (9th
Cir. 1976) (denial of petition to reopen by commission will not allow judicial review of
administrative decision after sixty day limitations period has elapsed, but review may be
had to determine whether denial of petition to reopen was arbitrary and capricious).
221. Where the right to review is limited by a statute of limitations, but such regulation
is not ripe for review for lack of the necessary information, petitioner may delay reconsideration until such information becomes available. This decision can then be appealed
under § 553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Eagle-Picher, Inc. v. EPA, 759
F.2d 905, 912-15 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v.ICC, 672 F.2d 146,
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or regulation to a specific situation, 22 2 uncertainty as to the applicability
of agency actions, 223 and equitable considerations, 2 24 may also toll the
running of statutes of limitations. Indeed, these examples are consistent
with the general willingness of courts to allow judicial review, if possible. 22 5 The Tenth Circuit's C.O.D.E. and Smith decisions exemplify this
willingness, even where strictly construed statutes of limitations might
otherwise preclude such review.
Curtis L. Michael

149 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 978 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Investment
Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1280-81 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
222. A statute of limitations will only bar direct review of an administrative rule. However, subsequent application of a rule may allow a court to review both the underlying rule
and its application to the situation at bar. Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub nom., ICC v. Texas, 105 S.Ct. 3513 (1985); Functional Music, Inc. v.
FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
223. Where an agency leaves room for doubt as to the applicability of its actions, the
statutory review period is tolled until the doubt is eliminated. Recreation Vehicle Indus.
Ass'n v. EPA, 653 F.2d 562, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
224. A statute of limitations may be tolled on "clear evidence that a failure to consider
a petitioner's claims would work a manifest injustice." Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. ICC, 761 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 909), cert.
granted, 106 S.Ct. 1457 (1986).
225. The Administrative Procedure Act's "generous review provisions" should be
given "hospitable interpretation." Only on a showing of "clear and convincing evidence"
of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).

